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AN OVERVIEW OF PROMISSORY NOTES
UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
I. Introduction
The status of promissory notes' under the Securities Act of 19332
and the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 has perplexed both the
judiciary and the business world for the past several years.' The
problem stems from the need to discern whether the term "security"
encompasses all forms of notes, or a more restricted category. This
Comment will examine the Congressional intent supporting these
acts and the various judicial interpretations given to their defini-
tional sections as regards promissory notes.
Both the Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 19341 define a "security" as "any note . . . or any certificate of
interest or participation in . ..any of the foregoing."7 This lan-
1. Where a promissory note qualifies as a "security," federal jurisdiction is available to
enforce the fraud provisions and possibly the registration requirements of the securities acts.
Otherwise, an injured party is restricted to those remedies offered under state law.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1970).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970).
4. - "The definition of the term 'security,' as used in the principal federal securities laws,
is for the most part one of the best kept secrets in recent legal history." Hannan and Thomas,
The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal Securities, 25 Hastings
L.J. 219 (1974). See also McClure v. First National Bank of Lubbock, Texas, 497 F.2d 490,
492 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975), in which the court observed that the
precedent dealing with the status of notes under the securities laws is unclear due to the
difficulties encountered by the judiciary in enumerating the required characteristics of a note.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1970).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970).
7. The full text of the 1933 Act's definition of a "security" is:
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit
for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security", or any certificate
of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guaran-
tee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970).
To promote free transferability of commercial paper, the Act exempts from its registration
requirements short term notes used for current financing. § 3(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77(c)(a)(3)
(1970). In an advisory opinion, the Securities Exchange Commission has indicated that the
scope of this exemption is quite narrow:
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guage, when read literally, brings all notes under the regulation of
the securities acts regardless of the circumstances under which they
were issued.' Indeed, prior to 1971, this so-called literal interpreta-
tion of the statutes was adopted by nearly all courts that dealt with
the issue?
The current judicial trend is away from a literal reading of the
statutes. ° The effect is to exclude from federal jurisdiction certain
forms of promissory notes which previously would have been in-
cluded." The Second Circuit has been extremely reluctant to stray
The legislative history of the Act makes clear that Section 3(a)(3) applies only to prime
quality negotiable commercial paper of a type not ordinarily purchased by the general
public, that is, paper issued to facilitate well recognized types of current operational
business requirements and of a type eligible for discounting by Federal Reserve banks.
Securities Act Release No. 4412 (Sept. 20, 1961). The anti-fraud provisions, however, include
notes of all maturities. See § 17(c), 15 U.S.C. 77q(c) (1970).
The 1934 Act provides a similar definition of a "security:"
(a) When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires-.
(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas,
or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certif-
icate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any instrument commonly known
as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or
banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine
months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is
likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970).
Although there are differences between these two definitions, the United States Supreme
Court has held that they are "virtually identical" and thus they will be treated as such.
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 342 (1967).
8. This is qualified by the exemption for short term commercial paper in the 1933 Act
and the definitional exemption for short term notes in the 1934 Act. See note 7 supra.
9. This stage of judicial interpretation was aptly summarized by Judge Goldberg of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit: the "definition of a security has been
literally read by the judiciary to the extent that almost all notes are held to be securities."
Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central National Bank of Jacksonville, 409 F.2d 989, 991-92 (5th
Cir. 1969).
See, e.g., Rekant v. Dresser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970); Llanos v. United States, 206 F.2d
852 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 923 (1954); Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc.,
321 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971); Prentice v. Hsu, 280 F.
Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); S.E.C. v. Vanco, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 422 (D.N.J. 1958), aff'd, 283
F.2d 304 (3d Cir. 1960).
10. See notes 39-66 and accompanying text infra.
11. In some cases, the reverse effect has resulted; that is, the inclusion of a note which
previously would have been excluded. See Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th
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from a literal interpretation of the acts,12 despite a rejection of this
approach by the United States Supreme Court 3 and by all the
circuit courts which have recently considered this issue. 4 The Sec-
ond Circuit thus remains the final stronghold of the traditional,
literal view. 5
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972) (promissory notes with a maturity of less than nine
months were held to be securities within the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 despite the
definitional exclusion of short-term instruments).
12. See, e.g., Exchange Nat'l. Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d
Cir. 1976); Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir.), rev'd sub nom.
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
13. See notes 143-45 and accompanying text infra.
14. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 n.14 (1974).
15. It may be more accurate to describe the present position of the Second Circuit as one
of confusion. This status results from a desire to follow the movement away from a literal
view, coupled with a distrust of the standards thus far applied by other courts in segregating
those notes which qualify for federal protection from those which are excluded. See notes 117-
86 and accompanying text infra.
A clarification of the current position of the Second Circuit, regardless of which approach
is selected, would clearly be valuable to all persons dealing in transactions involving promis-
sory notes. Generally, a party alleging fraud in the sale or exchange of promissory notes
prefers the literal view as this broadens the scope of federal jurisdiction. (But see note 11
supra for transactions involving notes with maturities not exceeding nine months). A federal
cause of action is more desirable to a defrauded party because of the procedural advantages
offered by the securities acts which are unavailable under most state laws. The federal
statutes provide for worldwide service of process and nationwide venue. 15 U.S.C. § 77v
(1970); 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970). This aids the plaintiff in the initial suit, and simplifies the
collection of an unsatisfied judgment since a successful plaintiff need not sue to enforce the
judgment in other jurisdictions. In addition, shareholder derivative actions may be main-
tained without the need for large security deposits which may otherwise be required under
state law to guarantee reimbursement of all expenses incurred by a prevailing defendant.
E.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE § 800 (West 1977); N.Y. Bus. Corn. LAw § 627 (McKinney 1965).
Prior to 1976, it might have been possible to succeed in a civil fraud action under the 1933
or 1934 Acts without having to prove the common law fraud requirement of scienter. See
Comment, Notes as Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 36 Md.
L. Rev. 233 n.4. This clearly made the federal forum preferable as negligence alone is far
easier to prove. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), altered this by holding
that some element of scienter is essential to any action based on §10(b) of the 1934 Act or
the S.E.C.'s Rule 10b-5. It is too early to determine the full effect of this holding upon the
desirability of a federal claim as opposed to an action under state law. For additional dis-
cussion of the advantages of federal jurisdiction, see Comment, Notes as Securities Under
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 36 Md. L. Rev. 233, 233-
34 nn. 4 & 5 (1976); Comment, Any Promissory Note: The Obscene Security. A Search for
the Non-Commercial Investment, 7 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 25, 30-31 (1975); Comment, The
Status of the Promissory Note Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1975 Ariz. St. L.J. 175,
177-78.
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II. Legislative Intent
The proper construction of the term "security" is governed by
Congressional intent.'" Thus, in order to determine the scope of the
securities acts as regards notes, it is necessary to examine the legis-
lative history supporting these statutes.
The overriding purpose behind the federal securities laws was to
regulate the nation's financial markets.'7 This regulation was
thought necessary in order to prevent the further occurrence of cer-
tain abuses which contributed substantially to the plunge of the
stock market in 1929 and the resulting depression.'" The acts were
not designed to serve as general antifraud provisions governing all
forms of transactions, but rather were directed towards the protec-
tion of investors.'9 This objective is clearly illustrated by the Senate
Reports which accompanied the 1933 Act:
The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public and honest busi-
ness. The basic policy is that of informing the investor of the facts concerning
securities to be offered for sale in interstate and foreign commerce and pro-
viding protection against fraud and misrepresentation.2
In McClure v. First National Bank of Lubbock, Texas,2' the dis-
trict court observed that the passage of the Truth in Lending Act 2
served as an indication that Congress itself did not feel that the
securities laws extended protection to consumer loans, and by im-
plication to commercial loans as well.2 3 Furthermore, in enumerat-
ing those transactions exempted from the Truth in Lending Act,
16. S.E.C. v. Joiner Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 354 (1943).
17. See, e.g., United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1974);
Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 28
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 214 (1959).
18. Id.
19. See note 20 and accompanying text infra.
20. S. Rep. No. 47, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933). See also Comment, Commercial Notes
and Definition of 'Security' Under Securities Act of 1934: A Note is a Note is a Note?, 52
Neb. L. Rev. 478, 487 (1973), where in which the author notes that the messages delivered
to Congress by President Roosevelt prior to the legislation of both acts indicate his concern
for investments, not for "ordinary commercial notes." Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332,
336 (1917), where the United States Supreme Court interpreted the central purpose of the
acts as being the protection of investors.
21. 352 F. Supp. 454 (N.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 930 (1975). See notes 44-58 and accompanying text infra for additional discussion
of this case.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.
23. 352 F. Supp. at 458.
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Congress distinguished "credit transactions .. . for business or
commercial purposes" from "transactions in securities."' 4 This im-
plies that the term "security" does not encompass notes issued for
credit purposes. Thus, all notes do not qualify as securities. Only
those notes which partake of the qualities of an investment fall
within the protections offered by the securities acts.
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman5 serves as further
support for the view that only investment notes, as opposed to com-
mercial or consumer notes, fall within the purview of the securities
laws. In Forman, the United States Supreme Court stated: "The
focus of the Acts is on the capital market of the enterprise system:
the sale of securities to raise capital for profit-making purposes, the
exchanges on which securities are traded, and the need for regula-
tion to prevent fraud and to protect the interest of investors.""5 The
Court determined that the nature of all securities transactions is
such that Congress intended the acts to be applied where the
"economic iealities" underlying the transaction so required, and not
simply because the name appended to the instrument was among
those enumerated in the definitional sections."
The "economic realities" analysis adopted by the Forman Court
clearly rejects the literal approach." The focus is now upon the
''economic realities" underlying the transactions involving the
notes. 9 If the "economic realities" support a finding that the notes
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1603.
25. 421 U.S. 837 (1974). The Court was faced with the issue of whether shares of stock,
the ownership of which were required to lease an apartment in a state subsidized and super-
vised non-profit housing organization, constitute securities. The stock was held not to be a
security, thus reversing the Second Circuit. See notes 137-47 and accompanying text infra
for additional discussion.
26. Id. at 849.
27. Id.
28. Id. Notes are no longer securities simply because they are so named. The Court noted
that S.E.C. v. Joiner, 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943), held "[ilnstruments may be included within
[the definition of a security], as [a] matter of law, if on their face they answer to the name
or description." Id. at 850 (emphasis added by'the Forman Court). The Forman Court
dismissed this language by seizing upon the conditional word "may" and concluding that in
Joiner, the Court "was not establishing an inflexible rule barring inquiry into the economic
realities underlying a transaction." Id.
The Forman Court withdrew slightly from its position of total rejection of the literal view
by stating that the name given to an instrument is not "wholly irrelevant" to a determination
of its status under the acts, especially in cases where a party relied upon the existence of
federal jurisdiction from the outset. Id.
29. Id. at 849.
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qualify as investments, they are of the type contemplated by Con-
gress when enacting the securities laws.'" If not, federal jurisdiction
is unavailable. The only perplexing issue involved in this seemingly
simplistic approach is the lack of a set of specific factors to be
evaluated when analyzing the "economic realities." The judiciary
is therefore left with the task of determining which attributes define
an investment note, and thus a "security" under the federal securi-
ties laws.
III. Historical Background and Rationale Supporting the
Majority View
Traditionally, the literal approach to the definition of a security
was prevalent in the federal courts.3 This resulted in the inclusion
of nearly all notes within the scope of the securities acts. Typical of
this position is Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central National Bank
of Jacksonville."2 In that case, Central National Bank was sued by
Lehigh Valley, which alleged that it was induced to purchase a
participation interest in a note issued to the bank. This was accom-
plished through the use of misstatements and omissions of material
facts on the part of the bank. In holding these notes3' to be within
the purview of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 35 the court relied
exclusively on the definitions enumerated in §3(a): 31 "the term
'security' means any note. . . or any certificate of interest or partic-
ipation in . . . any of the foregoing [note, stock, etc.]. '37 The cir-
cuit court explicitly stated that the "definition of a security has
been literally read by the judiciary to the extent that almost all
notes are held to be securities. 38
The Third Circuit, in Lino v. City Investing Co.,39 was the first
court of appeals to depart from the precedent of including all prom-
30. Id. The "economic realities" approach requires the judiciary to scrutinize each trans-
action with an eye towards legislative intent. Only those notes of an investment nature were
envisioned by Congress when enacting these acts, thus all others should be excluded.
31. See note 9 supra.
32. 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969).
33. Id. at 990-91.
34. The court also examined the transactions as participation interests. Id. at 992.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970).
36. 409 F.2d at 992.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970). See note 7 supra for the complete section.
38. 409 F.2d at 991-92.
39. 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973).
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issory notes within the securities acts. In that case, plaintiff, Lino,
had purchased the right to operate two franchise sales centers from
a subsidiary of City Investing Co.4 Payment involved both cash and
promissory notes.4' The circuit court seized upon the introductory
phrase to the definitional sections of both securities acts in order to
avoid the literal import of the language:
All of the definitional sections involved in this case are introduced by the
phrase "unless the context otherwise requires." The commercial context of
this case requires a holding that the transaction did not involve a "purchase"
of securities. These were personal promissory notes issued by a private party.
There was no public offering of the notes, and the issuer was the person
claiming to be defrauded. The notes were not procured for speculation or
investment, and there is no indication that FI [the subsidiary of City Invest-
ing Co.] was soliciting venture capital from Lino.2
The Lino court interpreted the introductory phrase as Congres-
sional authority which permits the judiciary to evaluate the circum-
stances surrounding each transaction in determining whether the
securities laws are applicable.43 This approach was adopted in
McClure v. First National Bank of Lubbock, Texas," where the
owner of fifty percent of a corporation sued both the president of the
corporation (who owned the remaining fifty percent) and one of the
bank's loan officers. 5 The plaintiff claimed that the defendant,
president, fraudulently induced her to agree to a $200,000 bank loan
secured by corporate assets."a The fraud resulted from representa-
tions by the defendants indicating that the money was needed for
legitimate corporate purposes." The complaint further alleged that
the defendant, president, used the funds borrowed by the corpora-
tion to cancel a personal, unsecured debt which he owed to the same
40. Id. at 690.
41. Id.
42. 487 F.2d at 694-95 (emphasis added by Lino court).
43. The court found the following vintage United States Supreme Court statement com-
forting in reaching such a novel conclusion: "a thing may be within the letter of the statute
and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
makers. Id. at 695 (quoting from Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458-59
(1892)).
44. 352 F. Supp. 454 (N.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 930 (1975).
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bank.4" The funds were replaced with the president's unsecured
promissory note payable to the corporation." Foreclosure by the
bank resulted in the plaintiff bringing her suit wherein she sought
both monetary and exemplary damages."
The district court held that these notes were not "securities"
within the meaning of the securities acts." This result stemmed
from a determination that the circumstances surrounding the trans-
actions were such that a literal reading of the statutes would frus-
trate the goals which Congress was seeking to promote by these
acts. 2 The court labelled the notes as "little more than ordinary
commercial loans,"5 the misuse of which constituted "no more than
internal corporate mismanagement."'"
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the holding was affirmed.5 How-
ever, a close analysis of the opinion indicates that a somewhat dif-
ferent construction was given to the "context" clause." Instead of
48. Id.
49. Id. The defendant, president, had already discharged the debt in bankruptcy proceed-
ings. Thus, any economic relief would have had to stem from a judgment against the bank
which was also a defendant due to the actions of its loan officer. Id. at 491.
50. 352 F. Supp. at 456.
51. Id. at 458. The court buttressed its holding by noting the absence of a "purchase or
sale" in the dealings which precipitated this litigation. Id. Thus, even if the notes had
qualified as "securities," jurisdiction would still have been lacking.
52. Id. at 457-58. The position taken by the court was that the acts were intended to
protect investors, and not commercial debtors or creditors. Id. See notes 16-30 supra for a
discussion of the legislative intent.
The district court found support for its decision to analyze the circumstances surrounding
the transaction in the following statement by the United States Supreme Court: "The rele-
vant definitional sections of the 1934 Act are for the most part unhelpful. ... Consequently,
we must ask whether respondents' alleged conduct is of the type of fraudulent behavior meant
to be forbidden by the statute . "Id. at 457 (quoting S.E.C. v. National Securities, Inc.,
393 U.S. 453, 466-67 (1969)) (emphasis added by McClure court). An additional Supreme
Court statement dealing with the applicability of several rules of statutory construction to
the securities acts served as further authority for avoiding the plain language of the statute
in order to more accurately serve the legislature's intentions:
However well [these rules] may serve at times to aid in deciphering legislative intent,
they long have been subordinated to the doctrine that courts will construe the details
of an act in conformity with its dominating general purpose, will read text in the light
of context and will interpret the text so far as the meaning of the words fairly permits
so as to carry out in particular cases the generally expressed legislative policy.
352 F. Supp. at 457 (quoting S.E.C. v. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943)).
53. 352 F. Supp. at 457-58.
54. Id. at 461.
55. McClure v. First Nat'l Bank of Lubbock, Texas, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975).
56. The "context" clause refers to the introductory language in both statutes "unless the
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utilizing the introductory phrase to avoid a literal interpretation,
the court focused on the definition of the term "note" and concluded
that the particular notes involved lacked the attributes of an invest-
ment, and thus fell outside of the scope of the securities acts. 7
On one hand, the [Securities Exchange] Act covers all investment notes, no
matter how short their maturity, because they are not encompassed by the
"any note" language of the exemption. On the other hand, the Act does not
cover any commercial notes, no matter how long their maturity, because they
fall outside the "any note" definition of a security. Thus, the investment or
commercial nature of a note entirely controls the applicability of the Act,
depriving of all utility the exemption based on maturity-length. 8
The analysis applied by the court of appeals in McClure" is more
accurate than that of the district court" or the Lino court.' The
"context" referred to in the prefacing phrase is that of the statute
itself, not the circumstances surrounding the transaction.2 Congress
was simply issuing a warning indicating that the definition of a term
may vary depending upon which section of the statute is being
applied.63 Once the definition of a term is properly resolved accord-
ing to the statutory context, it is "applied to, not defined by" the
transaction in issue. 4
The legislative intent indicates that the term "note," within the
context otherwise requires." See note 7 supra.
57. 497 F.2d at 494-95. Under this analysis, there is no need to utilize the introductory
phrase "unless the context otherwise requires." See text accompanying notes 68-74 infra for
a discussion of the test applied by the court in determining that the note under consideration
did not constitute a "security."
58. Id. at 494-95. The court indicated that further Congressional legislation or a definitive
decision by the United States Supreme Court contrary to present cases would be necessary
to sustain any other view of the intent of the legislators as regards the scope of the securities
acts. Id. at 495.
59. 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974).
60. 352 F. Supp. 454 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
61. 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973).
62. See Comment, Notes as Securities Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 36 Md. L. Rev. 233, 238-39 (1976); Comment, Any Promissory Note:
The Obscene Security. A Search for the Non-Commercial Investment, 7 Tex. Tech. L. Rev.
25, 38-89 (1975).
63. This is precisely the interpretation taken by the Supreme Court: "The meaning of
particular phrases must be determined in context .... Congress itself has cautioned that
the same words may take on a different coloration in different sections of the securities laws;
both the 1933 and 1934 Acts preface their lists of general definitions with the phrase 'unless
the context otherwise requires.' "S.E.C. v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969).
64. See Any Promissory Note: The Obscene Security. A Search for the Non-Commercial
Investment, 7 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 25, 40 (1975).
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definitional sections Of the securities acts, refers to investment
notes. 5 Therefore, the remaining obstacle lies in applying this defi-
nition consistently so as to separate security transactions from non-
security transactions."
IV. Commercial Notes Versus Investment Notes
The judiciary has had much difficulty enumerating the necessary
attributes of an investment note." The result of this difficulty is the
emergence of several tests, none of which is universally accepted. In
McClure v. First National Bank of Lubbock, Texas," the Fifth Cir-
cuit deemed the following factors particularly relevant." Where the
notes were offered to a class of investors, as opposed to a private
transaction between two parties, or were acquired for speculative or
investment purposes, the court would apply the securities acts."0
The second factor involved an examination of the quid pro quo:7'
where the maker received investment assets in exchange for the
notes, McClure would hold that an investment note was present,
and thus that the securities laws were applicable." This approach,
although sufficient for rejecting the claim presented in McClure,3
is clearly inadequate for general application. The court made no
attempt to define the terms "investment" or "investment assets."
Yet, these are indicia whose presence, according to McClure, trigger
the application of the securities acts. 4 An analysis of this nature
begs the question presented.
In Zabriskie v. Lewis, 5 the Tenth Circuit utilized a slightly differ-
65. See notes 16-30 and accompanying text supra.
66. The interpretation of the "context" clause as referring to the context of the statute,
as opposed to the context of the transaction is more accurate; however, the final analysis is
likely to be the same under either view. Both approaches rely upon legislative intent, thus
the dispositive issue remains the choice of criteria to be evaluated in distinguishing an
investment note from a commercial note.
67. McClure v. First Nat'l Bank of Lubbock, Texas, 497 F.2d at 492.
68. 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974); cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975).
69. Id. at 493. The court, however, indicated that the two factors selected are not necessar-
ily the only indicia appropriate for consideration. Id. at 493 n.2.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 494.
72. Id. It was noted that the receipt of investment assets could occur through direct as
well as indirect means. Id.
73. See text accompanying notes 44-50 supra.
74. 497 F.2d at 493-94.
75. 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974).
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ent approach in segregating investment notes from commercial
notes. 6 The court examined the use to which the proceeds of the
note were applied." The test is similar to the second part of the
McClure analysis where the receipt of investment assets was consid-
ered relevant." Under Zabriskie, if the proceeds were used to ac-
quire consumer goods or services, the note was commercial and
outside of the acts. 9 Where the proceeds were used for business
purposes, the transaction would invoke the securities laws if the
circumstances were such that stock would usually be issued instead
of promissory notes. 0 .
This analysis is helpful in cases where it is obvious that stock
would ordinarily be issued. An example is the promotion of a new
corporation, as was the situation facing the Zabriskie court.' In
addition, this approach prevents a party from circumventing the
regulatory scheme provided by the securities acts simply because a
note was issued instead of stock, or some other form of security.82
However, the test suffers the same pitfalls as the McClure ap-
proach.3 It was useful for those particular facts, but it is of little
value in situations where the facts differ. Cases will remain unre-
solved under this analysis where it is unclear whether the proceeds
went to business purposes or to consumer goods, or where it is diffi-
cult to determine whether stock would normally be issued. Thus,
there still exists the problem of defining "investment" in order to
avoid arbitrary decisions and enable potential litigators to weigh the
76. Id. at 551.
77. Id.
78. 497 F.2d at 494.
79. 507 F.2d at 551.
80. Id. This part of the court's test originated in a student Comment, Commercial Notes
and Definition of 'Security' Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Note is a Note is a
Note?, 52 Neb. L. Rev. 478, 501 (1973). The author also suggested several additional factors
which the court felt might be applicable to other circumstances. These factors include: (1)
use of proceeds to buy specific assets or services (commercial) rather than general financing
(investment), (2) risk to initial investment, (3) giving certain rights to a payee (investment),
(4) repaying contingent on profit or out of production (investment), (5) a large number of
notes or payees (investment), (6) a large dollar amount (investment), (7) fixed time notes
(equivocal) rather than demand notes (commercial), and (8) characterization by the parties
themselves.
81. 507 F.2d at 551.
82. See Rekant v. Dresser, 425 F.2d 872, 878 (5th Cir. 1970).
83. The Zabriskie court failed to define the terms used within the test. Differentiating
consumer usage of the proceeds from business usage does not appear any less complicated
than separating commercial notes from investment notes.
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merits of their respective cases.
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman84 applied a test tra-
ditionally used in situations where it is necessary to determine
whether an "investment contract" exists. 5 The test is "whether the
scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise
with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.""8 The Court
noted that "[t]his test, in shorthand form, embodies the essential
attributes that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a
security. The touchstone is the presence of an investment in a com-
mon venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be
derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others."87
This language would seem to require the presence of all the above-
mentioned elements in order for any instrument to be properly la-
belled a "security." 8 It is extremely unlikely that the Court in-
tended to restrict the applicability of the securities acts solely to
those transactions which conform to the definition of an
"investment contract." The Forman Court was not faced with the
issue of promissory notes, and an extension of the "investment con-
tract" analysis appears "to be of dubious value in that context." 8
Thus, the decision sheds no light on the proper focus of the judiciary
in distinguishing an investment note from a commercial note.
A final approach which merits analysis is the so-called "risk capi-
tal" test applied recently by the Ninth Circuit in Great Western
Bank & Trust v. Kotz. 0 This view maintains the commer-
84. 421 U.S. 837 (1974).
85. The test was originally espoused in S.E.C. v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1945). The
Court was presented with the question of whether an "investment contract" existed where
the defendants had publicly offered certain land-sale contracts for the purchase of small
citrus groves. The offers were coupled with optional service contracts engaging the defendants
to harvest and market the produce and distribute the pooled revenue among the purchasers.
The Court determined that an "investment contract" was present, thus triggering the appli-
cation of the securities laws since the definitional sections of both acts expressly include
"investment contracts." See note 7 supra.
86. Id. at 301.
87. 421 U.S. at 852.
88. Several commentators have taken precisely this position. See Comment, Notes as
Securities Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 36 Md.
L. Rev. 233 (1976); Comment, Any Promissory Note: The Obscene Security. A Search for the
Non-Commercial Investment, 7 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 25 (1975); Comment, The Status of the
Promissory Note Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1975 Ariz. St. L. J. 175.
89. Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1136 (2d Cir.
1976).
90. 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976). The court was faced with the question of whether
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cial/investment dichotomy, but analyzes "the nature and degree of
risk accompanying the transaction to the party providing the funds"
in determining whether an investment (and thus a security) is pres-
ent." In addition, this approach requires that the "risk capital" be
subject to "the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts" of others be-
fore it will rise to the status of a "security.""2
The court provided several criteria to be used in distinguishing a
"risky loan," which falls outside of the scope of the acts, from "risk
capital," which qualifies as a security. 3 The most significant factor
is the maturity length of the notes: 4 the longer the notes entitle the
issuer to the funds, the greater the risk of loss." The court extended
this to the point of stating that a note of short-term maturity is
"almost ipso facto not a security unless payment is dependent upon
the success of a risky enterprise, or the parties contemplate indefi-
nite extension of the note or perhaps conversion to stock."' The
logic behind this approach appears to be circular. The court was
attempting to distinguish notes which qualify as "securities" from
those which are merely commercial loans. 7 The test applied relies
predominantly on an assessment of the risk involved in the transac-
tion as measured by maturity-length, but an exception is provided
for situations where repayment hinges upon the future of a "risky
enterprise." 9 It is apparent that this approach will only create con-
fusing results."
A second factor considered under the "risk capital" analysis is the
extent of collateralization, if any. 00 The reasoning is that an unse-
cured creditor is more dependent upon the efforts of the obligor than
corporate notes issued in return for a ten-month line of credit from Great Western Bank &
Trust were "securities" under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Id. at 1253. In a per curiam opinion,
the notes were held not to be securities, thus affirming the district court's dismissal. Id.
91. Id. at 1256.
92. Id. at 1257.
93. Id. at 1257-58.
94. Id. at 1257.
95. The court acknowledged the existence of prior decisions indicating that maturity
length is nondispositive of the commercial/investment dilemma, but still concluded that it
was a significant element. Id.
96. Id. at 1257-58.
97. Id. at 1256.
98. Id. at 1257-58.
99. The court indicated that other provisions in the note, such as callability by the
obligee, may totally invalidate the time-based test. Id. at 1258.
100. Id.
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a secured creditor, and thus the risk of loss is greater.'' This factor
is also subject to exceptions, as noted by the court itself, and thus
fails to serve as a reliable indicator of a "security.' ' 10
Other indicia weighed by the court include the form of the obliga-
tion, 103 the circumstances surrounding its issuance, °4 the relation-
ship between the amount involved and the size of the obligor's busi-
ness,' and the contemplated use of the proceeds. 06 None of the
above factors considered by the court was controlling,07 and the
court expressly stated that future cases may require new sets of
considerations to be evaluated. °8 In addition, no attempt was made
to indicate the magnitude of risk necessary to elevate a commercial
note to the level of an investment.' °9
There are other faults which contribute to the weakness of the
"risk capital" approach. Because the test relies exclusively on the
level of risk involved, uncollateralized personal loans made by a
bank could be classified as securities due to the high level of risk,
although they are no more than ordinary commercial loans. 0 As the
financial status of the maker weakens, the risk factor increases. It
is not likely that the legislature intended the application of the
101. Id.
102. The court noted that situations do exist where a secured obligee is as dependant upon
the efforts of others as is an unsecured obligee; for example, where the "investment" is
collateralized by common stock of the obligor. Id. at 1258 n.4.
103. Id. at 1258. The form of the obligation is of little, if any, significance. The Supreme
Court has indicated on many occasions that substance governs over form in cases where the
two differ. See, e.g., United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1974)
(quoting Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)).
104. 532 F.2d at 1258. This factor is equivalent to the first prong of the McClure test,
namely, whether the obligations were issued to a single party or a class of investors. 497 F.2d
at 493.
105. 532 F.2d at 1258. The court reasoned that as the size of the "loan" increases in
relation to the total size of the borrower's business, the risk to the lender also increases. Id.
106. Id. Those proceeds essential to the formation of a new enterprise are more likely to
be securities than proceeds needed to maintain current working capital because the latter
type generate a return more rapidly and thus are less risky. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. One commentator has observed that despite a sizable list of criteria to be evaluated,
the court still is required to draw an arbitrary distinction because the test fails to provide
workable guidelines for measuring the required level of risk. Pollock, Notes Issued in Syndi-
cated Loans-A New Test to Define Securities, 32 Bus. Law. 537, 544 (1977).
110. In a concurring opinion, Judge Eugene Wright suggests that all notes received by a
bank as a result of funds extended through its normal lending channels are no more than
commercial loans. 532 F.2d at 1262 (Wright, J., concurring). See note 162 infra for additional
discussion.
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securities laws to hinge on the financial strength of either party.",
The "risk capital" approach does not provide a definitive stan-
dard which will distinguish investments from commercial loans.
Every lender of money incurs certain risks in anticipation of earning
a profit."' Therefore, judicial decisions under this analysis can only
lead to arbitrary holdings."'
The cases indicate that the courts have attempted to create a
distinction, grounded in Congressional intent, in order to prevent all
notes from being included under the securities laws."4 The distinc-
tion divides notes into two classes: investment notes and commer-
cial notes." 5 This test poses no obstacles to those cases falling
squarely within either extreme. It would not be disputed that a note
issued in exchange for a part-ownership in an enterprise qualifies as
an investment, nor that a note issued to a bank in exchange for a
loan needed to finance homeowner improvements constitutes a com-
mercial note. But there remains a sizable "grey area" within which
a decision under the present case law can only be arbitrary since all
efforts to promulgate a definitive set of factors which lead "to pre-
dictable results have been fruitless."6 It is perhaps this unfortunate
situation which has prompted the Second Circuit to remain the sole
federal forum which continues to rely upon the literal approach.
V. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit's first encounter with the issue of notes vis-
a-vis the securities laws was in Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo,
Inc."7 Movielab, a publicly owned corporation, had purchased cer-
tain assets from Berkey Photo, also a public corporation, in ex-
change for two twenty-year notes in the amount of $5,250,000
each." ' Subsequently, Movielab alleged fraud in the transaction
111. 32 Bus. Law. at 544.
112. C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1359 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
113. By coupling the fact that certain risks are inherent in all commercial and investment
notes with the lack of an adequate mechanism for evaluating the magnitude of risk, it
becomes apparent that the "risk capital" approach is of little value to future courts dealing
with promissory notes.
114. See notes 16-30 and accompanying text supra dealing with legislative intent.
115. Id.
116. See notes 67-113 and accompanying text supra.
117. 321 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971).
118. 452 F.2d at 663.
19781
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
and sought recision and damages."9
The district court noted the Congressional intent supporting the
statute" and the difficulties which might arise if federal jurisdic-
tion could be invoked in connection with fraud involving all types
of notes,' but the court was unwilling to depart from the literal
import of the language in the acts. 2 ' The court felt that the clarity
of the language prevented the application of any judicial discretion
in interpreting the definition of "security" and concluded that the
acts constituted a "sweeping prohibition" against fraud. 2"
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed in a per curiam opinion. 4
However, the court expressly stated that it was not deciding the
issue of whether federal jurisdiction would always be available in
connection with the issuance of all notes, regardless of how small the
transaction. 5 Thus, the court left itself room to adopt a more flexi-
ble approach, if desirable, without being hindered by precedent
which unequivocally required a literal interpretation.
The next case involving promissory notes under the securities acts
was Zeller v. Boque Electric Manufacturing Corp. "26 Boque Electric
had issued a demand note to its subsidiary, Belco Pollution Control
Corporation, to replace several open account loans totalling
$315,310."2 Zeller, a shareholder in Belco, brought this derivative
action alleging that the terms of the note constituted violations of
119. Id.
120. "The primary purpose behind the adoption of the antifraud provisions of the 1933
and 1934 Acts was to protect public investors .... " 321 F. Supp. at 808.
121. Id. The court was concerned with the "floodgate" type situation which might arise
if disputes involving all notes could be litigated in federal courts. See also Bellah v. First Nat'l
Bank of Hereford, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974).
122. 321 F. Supp. at 808. The court quoted from Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc.,
322 U.S. 607, 617-18, wherein the Supreme Court stated:
For the ultimate question is what has Congress commanded, when it has given no clue
to its intentions except familiar English words and no hint by the draftsmen of the
words that they meant to use them in any but an ordinary sense . . . . After all,
legislation . . . is addressed to the common run of men and is therefore to be under-
stood according to the sense of the thing, as the ordinary man has a right to rely on
ordinary words addressed to him.
321 F. Supp. at 808.
123. 321 F. Supp. at 809.
124. 452 F.2d at 664.
125. Id. at 663.
126. 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973).
127. Id. at 797.
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both securities acts. 2 8
The court first analyzed the definitional distinctions between the
two securities acts and concluded that the nine-month exemption
provided in section 3(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 193312 and in
section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193430 was appli-
cable only to prime quality negotiable commercial paper, as sug-
gested by the Securities Exchange Commission.'31 This view is in
accord with other circuits: a note's maturity length is not disposi-
tive of its status under the securities acts.1 32
The Zeller court then made the following statement which seem-
ingly indicated its rejection of the literal approach applied in Movie-
lab, and its adoption of the commercial/investment analysis:
It does not follow ... that every transaction within the introductory clause
of § 10, which involves promissory notes, whether of less or more than nine
months maturity, is within [the coverage of the securities acts] .... The
Act is for the protection of investors, and its provisions must be read accord-
ingly .... But we see no reason to doubt that Belco stood in the position
of an investor . . .
Zeller thus determined that an investment note was present and
accordingly granted federal jurisdiction.'34
The Zeller court cited Movielab as support for applying the com-
mercial/investment analysis. 35 However, Movielab had only hinted
at the possibility of relaxing the strict statutory construction pre-
viously applied by the Second Circuit. 3 ' Zeller extended this dic-
tum, and thus shifted the focus of attention from the language of
statutes, to the legislative intent supporting the statutes.
Forman v. Community Service, Inc.'37 presented the Second Cir-
cuit with the question of whether shares of stock in a nonprofit
128. Id. In addition, the plaintiff sought pendent jurisdiction for violations of the securi-
ties laws of New York and New Jersey. Id. at 799.
129. See note 7 supra.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See notes 39-65 and accompanying text supra.
133. 476 F.2d at 800.
134. Id. The court, therefore, reached the same result that would have been attained had
a literal interpretation been applied.
135. 476 F.2d at 800.
136. See text accompanying note 125 supra.
137. 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir.), rev'd sub nom. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,
421 U.S. 837 (1974).
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cooperative housing company constitute "securities" under federal
law.'1 The court definitively applied a strict literalist approach.'39
The stock was held to be a security regardless of the nature of the
transaction because "on its face" it was a share of stock and there-
fore within the statutory definition.'4 0
The Forman case, although dealing with the issue of "stock"
rather than "notes," constituted a clear retreat from the more flexi-
ble position taken in Zeller.' On appeal,' the Supreme Court re-
versed and expressly rejected the literal approach.4 3 The Court
cited Tcherepnin v. Knight' which stated that when "searching for
the meaning and scope of the word 'security' in the Act[s], form
should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on
economic reality."'45
Forman, if read narrowly, can be construed as having abandoned
the literal view in favor of a "substance over form" analysis only
where the transaction involved stock. However, the obvious exten-
sion of this approach is its application to notes, as well as all instru-
ments enumerated within the definitional sections. The securities
138. 500 F.2d at 1248. The action was brought by 57 residents who alleged fraud in the
sale of this stock resulting from "misrepresentations and material omissions" in certain
literature which was intended to attract purchasers. Id. at 1248-50. All residents of the
cooperative were required to purchase 18 shares of stock at $25 par value for each room in
their apartment. Id. Owners of stock were accorded only one vote on all matters, regardless
of the number of shares they owned; and, all stock was subject to the corporation's first rights
of refusal should a party move from the apartment building. If this right was refused, the
stock could have been sold to other dwellers at the original price plus a pro-rata share of the
mortgage amortization paid while the seller occupied his apartment. Id.
139. Id. at 1252. The court was aware of the growing attraction of the substance over form
approach, but felt that it was applicable only where federal jurisdiction was being expanded.
Id. at 1253. Where it was being contracted, the court felt that substance reigned supreme.
Id.
The court bolstered its holding by additionally finding that the stock constituted an
"investment contract" under the test set down in Howey. Id. at 1253-55.
140. Id. at 1252.
141. 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1973).
142. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1974).
143. Id. at 847.
144. 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
145. 421 U.S. at 848 (quoting Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 336). The Forman Court rejected
certain language in several prior decisions which might have been viewed as supporting a
literal view. 421 U.S. at 850. However, the Court did indicate that if a purchaser justifiably
relied on the availability of federal jurisdiction when acquiring the notes, the literal view
might then be appropriate.
The Court also rejected the circuit court's determination that an investment contract
existed, thus definitively depriving the parties of federal protection. Id. at 851-58.
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laws apply uniformly to all instruments which qualify,'46 and Con-
gressional intent is better served by the "substance over form" in-
terpretation. 47 Thus, it is reasonable to interpret Forman as a man-
date requiring an overall rejection of the literal interpretation in
favor of a more flexible view, such as that taken in Zeller.
The first Second Circuit case to interpret Forman in a transaction
which involved promissory notes was Exchange National Bank of
Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co.14 In that case, Touche Ross & Co.
was sued by the Exchange National Bank for violations of the anti-
fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.11 The bank had purchased from a brokerage
firm three unsecured subordinated notes in the aggregate principal
of $1 million. 10 The complaint alleged that the Bank had relied
upon opinions of Touche Ross & Co. which indicated that the finan-
cial statements of the brokerage firm fairly presented its financial
position and conformed to generally accepted accounting princi-
ples. '5 In fact, the financial position of the brokerage firm was far
weaker than indicated in the accounting reports, and the firm had
been placed in receivership with its assets being liquidated prior to
the suit. 52
Judge Friendly, writing for the court, determined that the notes
in question constituted "securities."' 53 The defendant's motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was therefore dis-
missed." 4 The court reviewed the judicial trend towards the applica-
tion of the commercial/investment test for classifying notes,'55 and
146. The definitional sections determine which instruments qualify for the application of
the remainder of the acts.
147. See notes 16-30 and accompanying text supra.
148. 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976).
149. Id. at 1127. The complaint specifically alleged violations of §17a of the Securities
Act of 1933, §§ 10b, 15c, 17a, and 18a of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the S.E.C.'s
Rule 10b-5, and a pendent state law claim for negligence. Id
150. Id. at 1128. The provisions contained within the notes were keyed to certain rules of
the New York Stock Exchange so that the proceeds could be utilized by the brokerage firm
to satisfy minimum capital requirements necessary to be listed on the exchange. Id. at 1129.
151. Id. at 1128.
152. Id. The bank felt that Touche Ross knew or should have known that the statements
it based its opinions upon contained false and misleading entries. Id.
153. 544 F.2d at 1138.
154. Id. at 1130.
155. Id. at 1133-36. The court discussed the following cases: Great Western Bank & Trust
v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976) (see notes 90-113 and accompanying text supra); C.N.S.
Enterprises, Inc. v. G & G Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
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the strong antiliteralist language of the Court in Forman,5 ' but
concluded that the language of the securities acts was sufficiently
precise to warrant strict adherence:
So long as the statutes remain as they have been for over forty years, courts
had better not depart from their words without strong support for the convic-
tion that, under the authority vested in them by the "context" clause, they
are doing what Congress wanted when they refuse to do what it said.1 7
The court's decision to apply a literal standard does not appear
to stem from a rejection of the rationale underlying the commer-
cial/investment dichotomy. Instead, it seems to result from a reali-
zation that there presently does not exist a test which can be used
by the judiciary to arrive at predictable results.5 8 In searching for a
viable solution to the literal view, the court was attracted to the test
proposed by Judge Wright's concurring opinion in Great Western
Bank & Trust v. Kotz. 59 There it was suggested that all notes re-
ceived by a bank through its normal lending channels constitute
commercial loans and thus are not "securities."'' ° This view, accord-
U.S. 825 (1975) (notes given as earnest money deposits were ordinary commercial paper and
thus not entitled to federal protection); McClure v. First National Bank of Lubbock, Texas,
497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975) (see notes 44-58, 68-74 and
accompanying text supra); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank of Hereford, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir.
1974) (The court applied the commercial/investment dichotomy holding a 6-month note not
be a "security" under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546
(10th Cir. 1974) (see notes 75-83 and accompanying text supra); S.E.C. v. Continental Com-
modities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974) (The court held certain promissory notes, includ-
ing several with maturity-lengths of less than nine-months, issued to reimburse customers of
a brokerage firm to be securities); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973) (see
notes 39-43 and accompanying text supra); Zeller v. Boque Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973) (see notes 126-36 and accompanying text
supra); Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971) (see notes 117-25
and accompanying text supra).
156. 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1974) where the Supreme Court stated: "We reject at the outset
any suggestion that the present transaction, evidenced by the sale of shares called 'stock,'
must be considered a security transaction simply because the statutory definition of a security
includes the words 'any . . . stock.'" The Court also stated that "a thing may be within the
letter of the statute, and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within
the intention of its makers." Id. at 849 (quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,
143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).
157. 544 F.2d at 1138.
158. The court summarized all of the decisions cited in note 155 supra and concluded that
"the efforts to provide meaningful criteria for decision under 'the commercial-investment'
dichotomy do not seem to us to carry much promise of success." Id. at 1136.
159. 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
160. Id. at 1260-62.
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ing to Exchange National Bank, "would afford the hope of bringing
a modicum of certainty into one large section of a field in bad need
of it."'' However, despite this optimistic language, Judge Wright's
approach was rejected because it would be inequitable to preclude
federal jurisdiction in all controversies involving a bank, especially
where the borrower asserts fraud on the part of the lender. 6 '
The literal interpretation of the acts in Exchange National Bank
is not without qualification. The court indicated that the introduc-
tory phrase "unless the context otherwise requires" might be applic-
able in future cases so as to avoid the literal impact of the statutory
language."3 However, the party seeking that result has the burden
of proving that the context is such as to require exceptional treat-
ment.' The court enumerated several transactions sufficient to
meet the required burden of proof:
[T]he note delivered in consumer financing, the note secured by a mortgage
on a home, the short-term note secured by a lien on a small business or some
of its assets, the note evidencing a "character" loan to a bank customer,
short-term notes secured by an assignment of accounts receivable, or a note
which simply formalizes an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary
course of business (particularly if, as in the case of the customer of a broker,
it is collateralized).'"
Unless a note is issued under circumstances strongly resembling one
of the examples listed above, the Second Circuit generally will ad-
here to the statutory language.'1"
161. 544 F.2d at 1137.
162. Id. at 1138. Judge Wright based his opinion on the premise that a bank typically has
a "superior bargaining position and can compel wide-ranging disclosures and verification of
issues material to its decision on the loan application." 532 F.2d at 1262. The Exchange
National Bank Court approved of this reasoning where the suit was brought by a bank, but
felt it inappropriate in actions brought against a bank since the bank's powerful methods of
disclosure are of no advantage to the issuer of the note. 544 F.2d at 1136-37. As a result,
Judge Wright's approach had to be rejected because the statute would not permit the same
note to be a security where the action was initiated by the borrower, but a commercial note
where the action was initiated by the bank. Id. at 1137.
163. Id. at 1137-38.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1138.
166. Id. The court acknowledged that this analysis is deficient in not affording complete
certainty, but considered it superior to the approaches taken by the other circuits. Id. It is
noted that "[a] more desirable solution would be for Congress to change the exclusions to
encompass 'a note or other evidence of indebtedness issued in a mercantile transaction,' as
is proposed in the ALI's Federal Securities Code, § 297(b)(3) .... " Id. This could be
complemented with a delegation of authority to the S.E.C. to explicate the quoted phrase.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
Exchange National Bank, therefore, returns the Second Circuit to
the traditional, literal view despite the Supreme Court's contradic-
tory language in Forman. "7 This position is qualified by the poten-
tial future application of the introductory phrase "unless the con-
text otherwise requires."'' 8 The literal view was selected because the
Exchange National Bank court felt that the approaches used else-
where failed to provide predictable results."6 ' However, the addition
of the "context" clause qualification injects an element of unpredic-
tability into the literal view, and thus defeats the goal of avoiding
arbitrary results. With the inclusion of this qualification, the pres-
ent position of the Second Circuit is best described as falling some-
where between a strict literal view and the majority's commer-
cial/investment analysis. 7 '
Altman v. Knight"' was the first district court case within the
Second Circuit to interpret Exchange National Bank v. Touche
Ross & Co. I In Altman, the plaintiff alleged violations of the Secur-
ities Exchange Act by the directors of Anaconda in the purchase of
another company.' Subject matter jurisdiction was based on the
existence of a "security" in the form of a five-year note."' The
Altman court noted the application of the literal interpretation by
Exchange National Bank, "I but nonetheless declined to include the
note issued by Anaconda within the definition of a "security.'' 76
Instead, Altman determined that the note was "similar in many
respects to a 'note delivered in consumer financing.' "'I Thus, the
defendants had met the burden of proof required by Exchange Na-
tional Bank in order to avoid the literal import of the statutory
167. See notes 131-47, 156 and accompanying text supra.
168. See notes 163-65 and accompanying text supra.
169. See notes 158-62 and accompanying text supra.
170. The court was apparently unsure of the wisdom of relying exclusively upon an appli-
cation of the literal approach in light of its having been rejected in all other circuits. Thus,
in the concluding paragraphs of the opinion, the commercial/investment approach was ap-
plied as additional support for the determination that the notes did qualify as "securities."
544 F.2d at 1138-39.
171. 431 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
172. 544 F.2d 1126 (1976).
173. 431 F. Supp. at 311.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 311-12.




language.78 Hence, the very first case within the Second Circuit to
apply the Exchange National Bank reasoning reached a result
contra to the literal interpretation by applying the "context" clause
qualification.
The Altman court, despite having satisfied the requirements of
Exchange National Bank, sought additional support for its holding.
The court cited Emisco Industries, Inc. v. Pro's Inc., 7 a recent
Seventh Circuit case with a similar factual pattern. There, the com-
mercial/investment dichotomy was utilized to reach the conclusion
that the notes involved were not "securities," but rather a cash
substitute in the nature of a loan.180 The notes in Altman were also
described as being a substitute for cash.' Thus, Altman is con-
sistent with the commercial/investment approach as well as with
Exchange National Bank. But because the court felt obligated to
bolster its conclusion through the citation of a case which applied
the commercial/investment test, Altman indicates either that
Exchange National Bank failed to clarify fully the proper applica-
tion of its analysis,8 2 or that Altman felt that Exchange National
Bank did not properly interpret the antiliteralist language of the
United States Supreme Court in United Housing Foundation, Inc.
v. Forman. 183 Regardless of the cause, Altman deemed it appropriate
to apply both analyses, an approach, which if followed by future
courts, can only lead to total confusion." 4
Altman plainly demonstrated that the Second Circuit should
reevaluate, or at least clarify, its present stature. The purpose in
adhering to the literal interpretation in Exchange National Bank
was to promote predictability for the benefit of both the judiciary
178. See notes 163-65 and accompanying text supra.
179. 543 F.2d 38 (7th Cir. 1976).
180. Id. at 40.
181. 431 F. Supp. at 312.
182. It is quite plausable that the district court was not certain that it had properly
applied the test described in Exchange National Bank, especially since the court was utilizing
the "context" clause exception to the general rule of literal interpretation.
183. See note 156 supra.
184. In the concluding paragraphs of Exchange National Bank, the Second Circuit also
fortified its holding by applying the commercial/investment dichotomy. 544 F.2d at 1138. The
use of the literal approach itself is of questionable validity in light of the generally accepted
interpretations of Congressional intent and the strong antiliteralist language in Foreman (see
notes 16-30, 156 and accompanying text supra), but the application of both the literal and
the commercial/investment analyses is purposeless.
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and potential litigators.'1 However, the qualification incorporated
by Exchange National Bank prevents the attainment of that goal.'86
In addition, the literal approach denies to the Second Circuit the
use of precedent set down in other forums. This creates a situation
which is likely to lead to an even greater number of arbitrary results
than would the application of the commercial/investment test.
VI. Conclusion
The Second Circuit's application of a literal approach in delineat-
ing the parameters of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 with respect to promissory notes should be
rejected in favor of the commercial/investment analysis. The literal
interpretation fails to accommodate Congressional intent,' 87 and of-
fers little, if any, advantage in attaining more predictable results.',"
By contrast, the commercial/investment analysis was specifically
created as a means of more accurately achieving the goals envi-
sioned by Congress when enacting the securities laws.'8 It is addi-
tionally favorable in that it permits the utilization of the body of
precedent that has developed and will continue to develop in the
remainder of the federal courts.
The optimal solution is for Congress to enact clarifying legislation
which definitively states its position on the scope of the securities
acts. Further Supreme Court rulings would certainly be of value;
however, the current dilemma exists because the legislative intent
is not accurately expressed within the statutes. Thus, Congressional
action is decidedly preferable. Until either Congress or the Supreme
Court alters the present status of the law, the judiciary should con-
tinue to evaluate each case individually and utilize prior case law
to aid in the task of segregating notes issued in commercial transac-
tions, which do not qualify as securities, from notes issued in invest-
ment transactions, which entitle the parties to seek redress in the
federal courts.
Frederick S. Green
185. See note 158 and accompanying text supra.
186. Altman exemplifies the fact that the literal approach taken by the Second Circuit
does not necessarily lead to predictable results. A strict literal view would have included the
note involved in that case within the securities acts.
187. See notes 16-30 and accompanying text supra.
188. See note 186 supra.
189. See notes 16-30 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol; VI
